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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FREDE.RICK RAY SIBERT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8564 
Appellant, Frederick Ray Sibert, was charged with and 
[after trial by jury in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County] convicted of, the crime of 
robbery. 
Appellant comes now before this Court appealing from 
certain rulings of the trial judge relative to the admission 
of evidence and from the sentence imposed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the trial, the complaining witness, Lyle Thomas 
Butters, testified regarding the facts surrounding the al-
leged robbery, and was cross-examined by counsel repre-
senting the defendant who sought to impeach the witness. 
The State then offered as a witness Police Officer John J. 
Ferrin, who testified to what the complaining witness had 
told him immediately following the alleged robbery. Ferrin 
testified from notes which he had taken at the time and 
these notes were offered and accepted into evidence. Coun-
sel objected to Ferrin's testimony and to the admission of 
his notes. 
On the 9th day of June, 1956, the Trial Judge sentenced 
the defendant to the indeterminate term as provided by 
law. The court denied the defendant probation. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY 
OF OFFICER FERRIN. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE NOTES OF 
OFFICER FERRIN. 
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3 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SUCH ERROR 
WAS HARMLESS AND WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF 
APPELLANT. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POW-
ERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO REFUSE TO 
GRANT THE APPELLANT PROBATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY 
OF OFFICER FERRIN. 
Briefly stated, the is:sue raised by appellant on appeal 
is whether it was proper for the Trial Judge to permit 
Officer Ferrin to testify as to a conversation had with 
the witness Butters immediately following the robbery. 
Counsel on cross-examination sought to impeach Butters 
by showing that his testimony at the trial was inconsistent 
with previous testimony given by him at a pre-trial hear-
ing (R. 20-43) . The alleged inconsistent statement related 
only to the color and model of the car used in the robbery. 
There was some further testimony that Butters had been 
shown a police report just previously to the trial. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
There should be no question of a violation of the hear-
say rule concerning this testimony of officer Ferrin's notes 
since they were not offered as. proof of the matter stated 
therein but rather to refute the impeachment (R. 47-49). 
With respect to evidence of this character the general 
rule is that prior statements of a witness, consistent with 
his testimony at the trial are not admissible in corrobora-
tion of his testimony unless the witness has been impeached 
and then only for the purpose of rehabilitating a witness. 
State v. Fouts, (1950) 221 P. 2d 841. Beyond this the 
courts are not in harmony and in some jurisdictions a num-
ber of exceptions apply to allow in prior consistent state-
ments. 
It is commonly held that when a witness's testimony 
has been discredited by an imputation of bias, prejudice or 
other motive to falsify, his consistent statements made at 
a time anterior to the date of the inconsistent statement 
tended to show that bias or prejudice did not motivate his 
testimony. Sweazey v. Valley TTansport, Inc., et al., (1940) 
107 P. 2d 567. Prior consistent statements are also ad-
mitted in cases where the testimony of the witness is 
assailed as a recent fabrication. "It is the general rule in 
this state that where the opposition has assailed the testi-
mony of a 'vitness as being of a recent fabrication, an ex-
ception to the Hearsay Rule allo"~s the admission of evi-
dence of statements or conduct prior to the claimed fabri-
cation and consistent 'vith the testimony of the witness at 
the trial, 'not to prove the fach~ of the case, but as tending 
to sho"v that the 'vitness has not been controlled by motives 
of interest and that he has not fabricated something for 
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5 
the purpose of the case.'" People v. Walsh, (1956) 301 
P. 2d 247. See also State v. Niernan, (1939) 8 P. 2d 713. 
It is difficult to see where harm would result in ad-
mitting a prior consistent statement provided it was made 
anterior to the alleged inconsistent statement, and provided 
it was made, as in this case, when the facts were fresh 
in the witness's mind. Here, through· cross-examination, 
there was imputed to the witness Butters prior false state-
ments. He made statements of fact at a pre-trial hearing 
of a certain nature and then at the trial after having been 
refreshed in memory by reviewing a police report he testi-
fied to different facts. Certainly it is only reasonable to 
admit statements made by the witness immediately follow-
ing the robbery for the purpose of refuting the impeach-
nlent. 
In a 1951 Connecticut trial a situation similar to the 
present case arose. A witness for the defendant in a per-
sonal injury action was impeached on cross-examination on 
the basis of a statement made by the witness to the plain-
tiff five years after the accident. Over objection, state-
ments made by defendant's witness to other witnesses 
shortly after the accident were admitted for purpose of 
rehabilitation. In affirming the trial court the Supreme 
Court adopted the following reasoning: 
"The defendant might well claim that the apparent in-
consistency between the recent statement and the witness' 
testimony could be accounted for by lapse of memory and 
that his memory had been refreshed before he testified. 
That he had made a statement shortly after the event when 
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his memory was fresh which was in accord with his testi-
mony, clearly was evidence which would tend to prove that 
the apparent inconsistency of his later statement was due 
to the fact that at the time he made it his memory had 
failed and had not been refreshed. With that explanation 
his testimony and his later statement could be reconciled 
and the apparent inconsistency be explained away." Thomas 
v. Ganezer, (1951) 78 A. 2d 539. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE NOTES OF 
OFFICER FERRIN. 
During the course of direct examination of the witness 
Ferrin, certain penciled notes describing a conversation 
with the complaining witness Butters, over objection of 
counsel, were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. 
The notes were written on five pages of small pad paper and 
were extremely brief. 
Wigmore has outlined a general principle applying to 
situations of this nature. "If by verifying and adopting the 
record of past recollection the witness makes it usable testi-
monially, and if by this verification alone can it become 
so usable, it follows that record thus adopted becomes to 
that extent the embodiment of the witness's testimony. 
Thus, (a) the record, verified and adopted, becomes a 
present evidentiary statement of the witness; (b) and as 
such it may be handed or sho"~n to the jury by the party 
offering it." Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Vol. III, 
Sec. 754, p. 97. 
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In a personal injury action in Maryland, a similar evi-
dence issue arose. A police officer's report was admitted 
a.r1u.ed d . . f h into evidence. It was .agned- that the a m1ss1on o sue 
report was error in that it violated the Hearsay Rule. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland said: 
"There is no point to this exception, however, 
in view of the fact that the oral testimony of the 
witness, which, significantly, was offered on behalf 
of the defense, simply confirmed the statements in 
his written report. There was. admittedly, no var-
iance in any essential particular between this writ-
ten and oral testimony, so that his oath became, in 
effect, the primary substantive evidence, relied upon. 
The witness's adoption of his written report made 
it his present assertion. . . . The ruling on this 
exception was, therefore, neither erroneous nor 
prejudicial." Cogswell, et al. v. Frazier, (1944) 39 
A. 2d 815. 
For a similar conclusion see Ettelson v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, 164 F. 2d 660. 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SUCH ERROR 
WAS HARMLESS AND WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF 
APPELLANT. 
A review of the trial record and particularly of the 
testimony of Butters and Ferrin reveals that the portions 
of Ferrin's testimony objected to, and his. notes, added 
nothing of substance to what Butters had already testified. 
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The latter positively identified the defendant, both on the 
stand and at a previous line-up, and he described the auto-
mobile used in the robbery. There was no disputive evi-
dence as to identity and the only points where inconsistency 
appeared were as to the color and model of the car, and these 
conflicts were certainly slight. 
It is a basic principle of appellate review that a cause 
will not be reversed for error unless it affects the substan-
tive rights of the party. The commission of error will not 
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. Section 77-42-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
As late as 1953 the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
said : "'V e will not reverse criminal causes for mere error 
or irregularity. It is only when there has been error which 
is both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the ac-
cused that a reversal is warranted." State v. Neal, (1953) 
262 P. 2d 756. A similar ruling was stated in State v. Jus-
t~en, 35 Utah 105, 99 P. 456. 
It has been held that a party complaining of error in 
the admission of evidence has the burden of showing preju-
dice from that error. Hunt v. lVooten, et al., (1953) 76 S. 
E. 2d 326. There has been no showing here that the admis-
sion of the evidence in question 'Yas of such a nature as to 
result in prejudice to the defendant. 
In a federal case "chere the issue was similar to the 
case before this court it was concluded: 
"We think that the question of the admission or 
rejection of evidence of prior consistent statements 
to sustain the credibility of a witness who has been 
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impeached by evidence of prior inconsistent state-
ments is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and that its ruling should not result in a 
reversal on appeal except where there has been a 
prejudicial abuse of discretion" Affronti v. United 
States, (1944) 145 F. 2d 3. 
The admission of the disputed evidence, if error, did 
not prejudice the substantive rights of the appellant. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the erroneous admission of 
evidence does not call for reversal of judgment, where the 
guilt of the accused is otherwise satisfactorily proved. 
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 152, 276 P. 166. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POW-
ERS 0~., THE TRIAL JUDGE TO REFUSE TO 
GRANT THE APPELLANT PROBATION. 
The primary consideration involved here is the mean-
ing to be drawn from the applicable statute. The last clause 
of Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads : 
". . . and may place the defendant on probation for 
such period of time as. the Court shall determine.'' The 
intent of such wording is clearly to vest in the trial court 
discretion in the matter of probation. 
In the case of Dimm.ick v. Harris, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as a general rule that: "Whether one convicted 
of crime and subject to punishment therefore, should be 
placed on probation is. a matter in such Court's discretion", 
107 Utah 471, 155 P. 2d 170, Page 172. 
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(It should be noted that prior to 1943, the first sen-
tence of what is now Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, began: "Upon a conviction." At that date the 
phrase, "a plea of guilty or," was inserted between the 
words "upon" and "conviction." The reason for the amend-
ment is not known.) 
It is important to look to the wording adopted by the 
court in passing sentence. 
"Now, I can't grant you probation for several reasons, 
one of which, of course, is that you deny your guilt in this 
matter," (R. P. 121) (italics supplied). 
Further on the court said "In addition to that your 
record is not favorable and your attitude is not favorable 
to obtain probation and for that reason you are committed 
forthwith." 
Thus the court mentions three reasons why the defen-
dant was denied probation, i. e., an unfavorable record, an 
unfavorable attitude and a denial of guilt. After having 
presided over the trial and having become somewhat ac-
quainted with the defendant, the court, acting within its 
discretionary power, felt that for several reasons it would 
not be con1patible with the public interest to grant the 
defendant probation. This action was entirely within the 
Court's powers. 
Appellant's contention seems to be that the effect of 
the Court's reasoning is to force the defendant to either 
te·stify against himself, or have probation denied him. But 
this assumes that the Court's only basis for denying proba-
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tion was the plea of not guilty. This was not the situation 
here, the Court mentioned two other reasons. 
In 1944 in a decision dealing with the interpretation 
of Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, then Sec-
tion 105-36-17, the following was stated: 
"It is apparent that 105-36-17 supra, gives the 
court much greater latitude and power in suspend-
ing imposition of sentence than was previously had. 
. . . Since the enactment of the statute this Court 
has held that 'trial courts are not given authority 
to suspend sentences as a matter of favor or grace, 
but only when it appears compatible with public 
interest.' . . . From the construction of the 
statute it is evident that the legislature intended 
trial courts should have considerable authority to 
reform wrongdoers. . . . The right to suspend 
imposition of sentence and the right to place one on 
probation is a discretionary right." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
GARY L. THEURER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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